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A NEW DILEMMA FOR THRIFT
INSTITUTIONS: JUDICIAL
EMASCULATION OF THE DUE-ONSALE CLAUSE
By

ROBERT KRATOVIL*

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of the due-on-sale clause' can be traced to
the financial collapse accompanying the Great Depression. The
country's banks, caught with heavy investments in illiquid real
estate mortgages, could not produce the funds to pay off the panicked depositors lined up outside their doors. Many banks, ordered closed by President Roosevelt when he took office in 1933,
never reopened. Those that did simply made no mortgage loans.
The state building and loan associations that survived the period also discontinued further mortgage financing. To overcome
this lenders' reluctance, the Federal Housing Administration
was created. The mortgage insurance it provided induced some
institutions to resume cautious mortgage lending; however,
lending without government insurance was virtually nonexistent. Then a system of federal savings and loan associations was
created and attracted depositors whose accounts were insured
by federal institutions. This insurance was also extended to deposits in state savings and loan associations. Gradually these
institutions resumed mortgage lending, but on a prudent basis.
Ultimately these thrift institutions financed the subsequent phenomenal growth of housing in America, and today they represent the major source of mortgage funds available to the
country's home buyers.
As mortgage financing again became available, mortgage
documentation began to improve. Among the improvements
was the appearance of the due-on-sale clause in mortgage contracts. In its early, unsophisticated form, the clause contained a
* J.D., De Paul University. The author is currently Professor at the

John Marshall Law School. In addition to his teaching responsibilities, Mr.
Kratovil has authored numerous legal articles as well as several textbooks

in the area of real property and mortgage law.
1. A due-on-sale clause allows the lender to accelerate the due date if
the mortgaged premises are sold without his consent.
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covenant giving the lender a right to accelerate the remainder of
the mortgage debt. The philosophy was simple and practical:
the lender, who had made a loan to one credit-worthy individual,
was assured that the home would only be sold to another creditworthy individual.
All went well until interest rates began to rise. In 1966, and
again in 1970 and 1974, disintermediation caused a major drain
on thrift institutions. 2 Disintermediation occurs when depositors in thrift institutions withdraw their money to take advantage of the higher interest rates offered by other forms of
investment. Finding themselves with many outstanding loans
at rates below the prevailing interest rates, the thrift institutions
began to search for alternative methods of increasing portfolio
yield. 3 The due-on-sale clause became a means toward this end.
When the original borrower attempted to sell his home subject
to the existing mortgage, the lender refused to consent to the
sale unless the purchaser would agree to pay a higher interest
rate on the mortgage loan. Many borrowers and their purchasers resisted this requirement. Early attacks tended to focus on
the proposition that the lender's use of the clause to force an
increase in the interest rate constituted an illegal restraint on
alienation. Early decisions sided with the lender, finding either
that the restraint imposed was reasonable, or that there was in
fact no restraint at all. 4 Later decisions, expressing a diversity
2. Prior to the first credit crunch in 1966, which was followed by one
in 1970, [and] one in 1974 ... thrift institutions were able to bear the
burden of providing the, financing to support the growth of housing in
America. There was little or no need for the movement of housing instruments from one institufion to another because there existed a fairly
well-developed brokerage system. This mortgage brokerage system operated in a manner which enabled mortgages to be moved from capital
surplus to capital short areas and vice versa without any great difficulty. The real problems occurred beginning in 1966 when disintermediation started to take money out of the thrift system. Let us
Disintermediation is simply that point
define disintermediation ....
in time when interest rates, particularly interest rates on government
securities, rise to a point where money flows out of savings institutions
[and into government securities] thereby preventing such institutions
from making mortgage loans. Disintermediation and reintermediation-which is a reversal of that process-are words that were probably
in our language a long time ago but became important beginning in
1966.
Dall, The Conventional Mortgage-Backed Security, in FNMA-FHLMC General Counsels' Conference 159-60 (1978).
3. See text accompanying note 54 infra.
4. Malouf v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240
(1973); Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1
(1975); Chapman v. Ford, 246 Md. 26, 227 A.2d 26 (1967); First Com. Title Inc.
v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976); Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Van Glahn, 144 N.J. Super. 48, 364 A.2d 558 (1976); Paydan Inc. v. Kiriaki,
130 N.J. Super. 141, 325 A.2d 838 (1974); Mutual Real Estate Inv. Trust v. Buf-
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of legal philosophies, held against the lender when the purchaser was adjudged to be credit-worthy. The battle having
6
been joined, legal periodicals leaped into the fray.
FORM AND RECOGNITION OF THE CLAUSE

In its early form the due-on-sale clause was simply one of
many covenants in a broad acceleration clause covering breach
of covenant in general. 7 After courts began to accord separate
falo Say. Bank, 90 Misc. 2d 675, 395 N.Y.S.2d 583 (App. Term 1977); Crockett
v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976), noted in
55 N.C. L. REV. 310 (1977); Peoples Sav. Ass'n v. Standard Indus. Inc., 22
Ohio App. 2d 30, 257 N.E.2d 406 (1970); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Neilson,
26 Utah 2d 383, 490 P.2d 328 (1971).
5. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Britton, 345 So. 2d 306 (Ala. 1977);
Patton v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 473, 578 P.2d 152 (1978);
Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 481 S.W.2d 725 (Ark. 1972); Tucker
v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 625, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1974); Clark v. Lackenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1970); Nichols v. Ann Arbor
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 250 N.W.2d 804 (Mich. 1977); Sanders v. Hicks, 317
So. 2d 67 (Miss. 1975); Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Felter, 564 P.2d
1013 (Okla. 1977).
6. Bartke & Tagaropulos, Michigan's Looking Glass World of Due on
Sale Clauses, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 971 (1978); Bonanno, Due on Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real Estate Financingin Californiain Times of Fluctuating Interest Rates-Legal Issues and Alternatives, 6 U.S.F. L. REV. 267
(1972); Cunningham & Tischler, Transfer of the Real Estate Mortgagor's
Interest, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 24 (1973); Humphrey, Tucker v. Lassen-The
Demise of the Due-on-Sale Clause in California?, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 665
(1976); Jacoway, Mortgages-A Catalogue and Critique on the Role of Equity in the Enforcement of Modern-Day "Due-on-Sale" Clauses, 26 ARK. L.
REV. 485 (1973); Koerselman, Half-Way Mark Reached in the Demise of the
Inequitable Application of the "Due-on-Sale" Clause, 3 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
111 (1975); Short, Applying the Brakes to Acceleration Clauses: Controlling
Their Misuse in Real Property Secured Transactions,9 CAL. W. L. REV. 514
(1973); Volkmer, The Application of the Restraintson Alienation Doctrine to
Real Property Security Interests, 58 IOWA L. REV. 747 (1973); Warren, Is the
Practiceof Raising the Interest Rate in Returnfor not Exercising an Acceleration Clause on Assumption of a Mortgage Illegal in Texas as a Restraint
on Alienation?, S. TEX. L.J. 296 (1972); Wilner, Due on Sale and Due on Encumbrance Clauses in California,7 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 306 (1974); Comment, Tucker v. Lassen: Due-on-Sale Clauses in Land Sale Contracts----a
Victory for the Consumer-Buyer, 11 CAL. W. L. REV. 578 (1975); Comment,
Beyond Tucker v. Lassen: The Future of the Due-on-Sale Clause in
California,27 HASTINGS L.J. 475 (1975); Comment, Mortgage Consent to Sale
Clause: a Reasonable Restraint on Alienation?,8 J. MAR. J. 513 (1975); Comment, Deeds of Trust-RestraintsAgainst Alienation-Due-on Clause is an
UnreasonableRestraint on Alienation Absent a Showing of Protection of
Mortgagee's Legitimate Interests, 47 Miss. L.J. 331 (1976); Comment, Mortgages: Restrictionson Transfer of the Fee-Effect of Due-on-Sale Clauses,28
OKLA. L. REV. 418 (1975); Comment, Use of "Due-on-Sale" Clauses to Gain
CollateralBenefits: A Common-Sense Defense, 10 TULSA L.J. 590 (1975). See
also Subcommittee on "Due-on" Clauses, Report, 13 REAL PROP., PROB. &
TR. J. 891 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Due-on Clause Report].
7. As is evident, early versions of the clause were unsophisticated.
The clause contained a covenant not to convey without the lender's consent. The clause, in this form, is the form considered in Baker v. Loves Park
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consideration to the due-on-sale aspects of the clause, in effect
splitting the clause, 8 lenders' draftsmen segregated the due-onsale provision into a separate article. Sophisticated versions of
the clause appeared. 9 A sophisticated clause will expressly inSav. & Loan Ass'n, 61 111. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975). Such a form gratuitously invites an attack based on the restraints on alienation rule. This
could have been avoided by use of the early FHA form:

If there shall be any change in the ownership of the premises covered hereby without the consent of the Grantee, the entire principal
and all accrued interest shall become due and payable at the election of
the Grantee, and foreclosure proceedings may be instituted thereon.
HOAGLAND, STONE & BRUEGGEMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE, 14 (6th ed. 1977).

The FHA version of the due-on-sale clause originated in the FHA mortgage forms of Georgia, Puerto Rico and Ohio in the 1930's and Oregon's form
in 1940. Louisiana vendors' lien form included such a provision in its 1938
form. These clauses were deleted between 1958 and 1962. Letter from Robert F. Hollister, Assistant General Counsel, HUD, to author (Nov. 20, 1978).
See also Hood & Kushner, Real Estate Finance: The Discount Point System
and Its Effect on Federally Insured Home Loans, 40 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 1
(1971).

8. See Annot., 31 A.L.R. 733 (1924).
9. See Comment, Debt Acceleration on Transfer of Mortgaged
Property, 29 U. MiAMI L. REV. 584 (1975). The FHLMC mortgage form, as

revised, contains a form of due-on-sale clause, which incidentally, specifically provides for an increase in interest:
19. TRANSFERS OF THE PROPERTY OR BENEFICIAL INTERESTS IN
BORROWER; ASSUMPTION. On sale or transfer of (i) all or any part
beneficial interests in
of the Property, or any interest therein, or (ii)
Borrower (if Borrower is not a natural person or persons but is a corporation, partnership, trust or other legal entity), Lender may, at Lender's

option, declare all of the sums secured by this Instrument to be imme-

diately due and payable, and Lender may invoke any remedies permitted by paragraph 27 of this Instrument. This option shall not apply in
case of
(a) transfers by devise or descent or by operation of law upon the
death of a joint tenant or a partner;
(b) sales or transfers when the transferee's creditworthiness and
management ability are satisfactory to Lender and the transferee has executed, prior to the sale or transfer, a written assumption agreement containing such terms as Lender may

require, including, if required by Lender, an increase in the
rate of interest payable under the Note;

(c)

(d)

the grant of a leasehold interest in a part of the Property of
three years or less (or such longer lease term as Lender may
permit by prior written approval) not containing an option to
purchase (except any interest in the ground lease, if this Instrument is on a leasehold);
sales or transfers of beneficial interests in Borrower provided
that such sales or transfers, together with any prior sales or

transfers of beneficial interests in Borrower, but excluding
sales or transfers under subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, do
not result in more than 49% of the beneficial interests in Borrower having been sold or transferred since commencement
of amortization of the Note; and
(e)

sales or transfers of fixtures or any personal property pursuant to the first paragraph of paragraph 6 hereof.

FNMA-FHLMC General Counsels' Conference 148-49 (1977).
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clude, as an event triggering acceleration, the placing of a junior
encumbrance on the property, 10 or selling the property by
means of an installment contract." The exact language of the
clause may be crucial in determining whether it is the original
has the burden of obtaining the
borrower or his purchaser who
12
lender's consent to the sale.
CURRENT JUDICIAL AND STATUTORY APPROACHES:
VERSUS PORTFOLIO PROTECTION

CONSUMERISM

Courts have long seen fit to grant equitable relief to borrowers attempting to escape the enforcement of acceleration
the protection
clauses. Especially appealing to equity has been
13
of a mortgagor against his inadvertent default.
10. This is a common provision in corporate mortgages, which is beyond
the scope of this article.
11. Whether the installment contract is a "sale" that triggers the dueon-sale clause is a topic that has recently engendered considerable discussion. Comment, Beyond Tucker v. Lassen: The Future of the Due-on-Sale
Clause in California,27 HASTINGS L.J. 475 (1975). Newer versions of this
clause deal specifically with this problem.
12. It may reveal an intention that the seller was obligated to obtain a
consent or waiver by the mortgagee. Or it may allow this burden to fall on
the buyer. Stewart Title & Trust Co. of Phoenix v. Ordean, 528 F.2d 894 (9th
Cir. 1976). It has been held, quite reasonably, that the burden of proof rests
on the borrower to show that his buyer is credit-worthy and the lender's
security is not impaired. First Com. Title Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 550
P.2d 1271 (1976).
13. Justice Cardozo stated the classic case for equitable relief from acceleration:
There is no undeviating principle that equity shall enforce the covenants of a mortgage, unremoved by an appeal ad misericordiam, however urgent or affecting. The development of the jurisdiction&of the
chancery is lined with historic monuments that point another course
if it is so
Equity declines to give effect to a covenant ...
....
unconscionable ... as to be equivalent in its substance to a provision
for a penalty ....
. . . [A]cceleration clauses in mortgages do not constitute an exception. They are not a class, removed from interference by force of someThe distinction lies in
thing peculiar in their internal constitution ....
this only, that the punctual payment of interest has an importance to the
lender as affecting his way of life, perhaps the very means of his support,. . . II]t is a difference merely of degree,. . . a test wherewith to
gauge the measure of the hardships, the extent of the oppression.
[.T.
There may be conditions in which the enforcement of such a
clause according to the letter of the covenant will be disloyalty to the
basic principles for which equity exists ....
[.F.
Flor always the gravity of the fault must be compared with the
gravity of the hardship. (citations omitted) Let the hardship be strong
Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 254
enough, and equity will find a way ....
N.Y. 1, 8-13, 171 N.E. 884, 886-89 (1930) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
A generation later, it was clear that Cardozo's dissent had become the
law. Bisno v. Sax, 175 Cal. App. 2d 714, 728, 346 P.2d 814, 823 (1959) (citing
other jurisdictions which also adopted the Graf dissent). Unconscionabil-
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As the language of due-on-sale clauses became more sophisticated, some courts allowed the lender to exercise his contrac14
Others,
tual right according to the terms of the agreement.
however, provided varying degrees of protection to the mortgagor. i5 One court attempted to synthesize the various decisions
by providing the following classifications:
No jurisdiction has held 'call clauses' to be invalid per se, and
they have been enforced and found unenforceable by the various
state courts in a rather patchwork application of equitable principles based on essentially five basic rationales: (1) a doctrine of
strict construction requiring all conditions for acceleration to be
met before acceleration is permitted; (2) a requirement that the
mortgagee justify his refusal to consent to the purchase before acceleration is permitted; (3) acceleration permitted based on the
premise the mortgagee has the right to protect the security unless
it would be inequitable under the circumstances; (4) refusal to permit acceleration if no harm to the mortgagee would result from the
transfer; (5) approval of acceleration clauses as a reasonable busion alienation,
ness practice and not as an unreasonable restraint
16
unless inequitable under the circumstances.
As the court indicates, a survey of decisional law provides ready
support for either the mortgagor's or mortgagee's position.
California'sStatutory Approach
Several states have enacted statutes aimed at the provisions
of mortgage contracts, and others can be expected to do so. As
ity has become the key word in the court's adjudication of the validity of
foreclosure based on acceleration clauses. See, e.g., Delgado v. Strong, 360
So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. 1978); Streets v. M.G.I.C. Mortgage Corp., 378 N.E.2d 915,
919 (Ind. App. 1978); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tenn. 1973);
State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsey, 565 P.2d 413, 417 (Utah 1977); Miller v. Pacific
First Fed. Sav. &Loan Ass'n, 545 P.2d 546, 549 (Wash. 1976). See also 55 AM.
JUR. 2d Mortgages § 371 (1971).
The majority in Graf had allowed foreclosure where the default occurred after an arithmetical error by the mortgagor's clerk resulted in an
underpayment of less than 10% of the interest on a payment for which payment had been tendered immediately upon discovery of the mistake. Protecting against inadvertent default is particularly appealing to modern
courts of equity. See Rosenthal, Role of Equity in PreventingAcceleration
Predicatedupon a Mortgagor'sInadvertent Defaults, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV.
897 (1971).
Though Cardozo would have held for the mortgagor in Graf,his opinion
stresses the importance of interest to a lender, and the need to balance
hardships. That dissent was written during the great depression. Query for
whom the great judge might hold in a "due-on-sale clause" case in a period
of soaring interest rates? "In equity as in mechanics, action and reaction
are equal and opposite. The equity that one asks one must be ready to concede." 254 N.Y. at 13, 171 N.E. at 889.
14. See note 4 supra.
15. See note 5 supra.
16. Continental Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Filter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1017 n.4
(Okla. 1977). See also Due-on Clause Report, supra note 6.
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might be expected, California is in the vanguard of states legislating in this area.
One statutory provision requires that, with four or fewer
residential units, any acceleration clause must appear in both
the mortgage and the note.1 7 Evidently the legislature felt this
additional consumer disclosure would be helpful, since California's use of the master mortgage I8 recording procedure might
cause the clause to be overlooked on the short form master
mortgage unless it also appeared on the mortgage note. In another section, acceleration is forbidden because of the mortgagor's placing a junior encumbrance on the property only where
four or fewer housing units are involved. 9 This was a legislative
reaction to a state supreme court decision 20 which had limited
enforcement to cases where the placing of a junior encumbrance
endangered the lender's security; the court apparently overlooked the fact that all corporate mortgages contain an elaborate
clause forbidding junior financing. The difficulty with this provision is that it cannot be reconciled easily with the previous provision, also amended after the court decision, which implicitly
21
validates such acceleration.
The California statutes also forbid the use of the lock-in
clause prohibiting prepayment. 22 In addition, there are limitations on allowable penalties for prepayment within five years,
23
and a prohibition on penalties for prepayment after five years.
In another section, California has authorized the use of a
variable rate mortgage, with limitations placed on the mode,
24
timing and extent of allowable changes in interest rates.
This patchwork of provisions reveals the California legislature's conception of the equities of the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship. Simply put, whatever bears harshly on the
mortgagor is inequitable. Should interest rates decline, the
mortgagor is protected by being given the right to prepayment.
17. CAL. [Crv.] CODE § 2924.5 (West 1974). See also VA. CODE § 6.1-330.34
(Supp. 1978) (requiring that a due-on-sale clause be "in capital letters or

underlined").
18.

See KRATOVIL, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE § 58 (1972).

19. CAL. [Crv.] CODE § 2924.6(a) (5) (C) (West Supp. 1979). Accord, VA.

CODE § 6.1-2.5 (Supp. 1978).
20. La Sala v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97
Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).

21. Requiring that such a clause be embodied in both the mortgage and
the note implies that such a clause is valid. See Marantz, Consumerism
Reaches the Sacrosanct Trust Deed, 52 CALIF. S.B.J. 203 (1977).
22. CAL. [Crv.I CODE § 2954.5(a)(1) (West Supp. 1979) which applies to
obligations of $100,000 or less.

23.

CAL. [CrV.] CODE § 2954.5(b) (West Supp. 1979).

24. CAL. [Crv.] CODE § 1916.5 (West Supp. 1979).
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Yet should interest rates increase, the mortgagee is afforded no
protection except being allowed to implement highly unmarketable variable interest rate schemes. 25 The only alternative for
the mortgagee is to resort to the due-on-sale clause upon the
mortgagor's sale of the home to upgrade the interest rate paid
by the next borrower. Under a straightforward reading of the
California statutes, this would appear to be permissible. 26 However, the California Supreme Court has effectively precluded
use of the clause for this purpose.
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America
A recent California Supreme Court decision appears destined to become a leading case limiting the applicability of the
due-on-sale clause. In Wellenkamp v. Bank of America,2 7 a borrower sold property subject to a mortgage deed of trust, and the
lender threatened to accelerate the debt unless the buyer
agreed to a higher interest rate. In an action by the buyer for
injunctive and declaratory relief, the court held that the lender
could only exercise the clause upon a showing that it was necessary to protect against impairment of the property or default by
28
the buyer who assumed the debt.
Declining to examine authority in other jurisdictions, the
court framed the issue as whether, under California law, the
"automatic" exercise of the clause constituted an unreasonable
restraint on alienation. 29 The court's test of reasonableness involved balancing the "quantum of restraint,the actual practical
effect upon alienation" against the justification for enforcement
of the clause. 30 In prior dicta, the court had suggested that the
restraint. imposed by the clause in the case of an outright sale
would be de minimis.3 1 The court qualified these earlier statements, stating that it was then referring to the situation where
the seller received full payment from the buyer and thus was
25. See note 55 and accompanying text infra.
26. This is not so in all states. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-165 (Supp.
1976) (bars the use of the clause unless the buyer is uncreditworthy and
limits the increase in interest or fees upon the assumption of the mortgage).
Due-on Clause Report, supra note 6, finds that legislation on the exercise of the clause "has not prohibited, but has permitted such use within far
more clearly defined limitations than the case law has provided." Id. at 935.
27. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
28. Id. at 953, 582 P.2d at 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
29. Id. at 948-49, 582 P.2d at 973-74, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 949, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383, referring to the court's
previous decisions in Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526
P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974); La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5
Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1133, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
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able to pay off the mortgage. In the usual case, the seller was
able to obtain full payment because the buyer had obtained independent mortgage financing. The court noted that in times of
tight money, new financing may become unavailable and the
buyer may not be able to produce the cash to pay the full
purchase price. Like the present plaintiff, the buyer would want
to pay the seller only the amount of his equity and assume the
debt remaining on the deed of trust. However, if the lender insists on exercising the clause in this situation, the buyer will be
unable to provide the necessary funds and the sale will not be
completed. If the buyer is compelled to refinance at a higher
interest rate, he may insist on a lowering of the purchase price
to have the seller absorb some or all of the increased cost. In
either case, the court concluded, a significant restraint on aliena32
tion may occur.
Against this potential restraint the court balanced the interests of the lender. The court found unpersuasive the lender's
argument that the transfer of the property to an unapproved
buyer increased the possibility of waste or default. Because the
buyer may have made a relatively large down payment by giving
the seller his equity, he would have sufficient incentive to protect the property. In addition, he may in fact be more creditworthy than the seller to whom the lender originally extended
33
credit.
The court also expressly found the lender's interest in maintaining its loan portfolio at current interest rates to be an improper motive for exercising the clause. Though it recognized
the need for thrift institutions to provide their depositors with a
competitive return, it stated that the due-on-sale clause could
not be used to achieve that result. The sole purpose of the
clause was to protect the lender's security against impairment.
It is up to the lender to take into account factors of economic
uncertainty and inflation in fixing the duration and interest
rates on long-term loans. If the lender's forecasts fail to predict
the actual increase in interest rates, the court stated, "it would
be unjust to place the burden of the lender's mistaken economic
projections on property owners. '34 The court concluded that "a
due-on clause contained in a promissory note or deed of trust
cannot be enforced upon the occurrence of an outright sale unless the lender can demonstrate that enforcement is reasonably
necessary to protect against impairment to its security or the

32. Id. at 950-51, 582 P.2d at 974-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383-84.
33. Id. at 951-52, 582 P.2d at 975-76, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85.
34. Id. at 953, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
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risk of default.
The court expressly limited its decision to institutional lenders.36 This reflects the fact that, when a private party sells his
home and takes back a purchase money mortgage with a dueon-sale clause, he may conceivably have a different motivation
than an institutional lender. When a home owner is forced by
circumstances to sell during a period when no mortgage money
is available to the potential buyer, he may execute a purchase
money mortgage with a due-on-sale clause, intending that it be
discharged as soon as conventional financing becomes available.
The court expressed no opinion whether this type of mortgage
could be accelerated upon the resale of the home.
Of course, the great majority of home sales involve a discharge of the existing first mortgage at closing. Technically, a
brief breach of the clause may occur when an executory cash
contract for sale is entered into. By no stretch of the imagination can this situation be deemed to fall within the intent of the
due-on-sale clause, and Wellenkamp does not change the law in
37
this regard.
Restraints on Alienation-What Public Policy?
Little will be gained by rehashing the venerable property
rules governing ancient restraints on alienation, or by struggling
with the general formulations of the Restatement of Property
that grapple with these traditional law school problems. It is
also unnecessary to consider arguments attacking the clause as
a clog on the equity. Clogging exists where the lender exacts a
collateral advantage, such as the option to purchase other land
owned by the borrower2m This well-understood doctrine is inappropriate in concept for dealing with the problems presented by
39
the due-on-sale clause.
The fact is that the rules of restraints on alienation have not
had a logical or consistent development. 4° For any given form of
restraint, its utility today tends to be measured against the inju35. Id., 582 P.2d at 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
36. Id. at 952 n.9, 582 P.2d at 976 n.9, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.9.
37. The technical breach occurs because the doctrine of equitable conversion makes the buyer the equitable owner upon the execution of the
contract for the sale of land. At all events the existing mortgage is paid at
closing.
38.

See generally OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 96

(2d ed. 1970).
39. But see Koerselman, Half-Way Mark Reached in the Demise of the
Inequitable Application of the "Due-on-Sale" Clause, 3 PEPPERDINE L. REV.

111 (1975).
40. See Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill.
2d 119, 123, 333
N.E.2d 1, 3 (1975) (citing authorities).
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rious consequences flowing from its enforcement, and thus the
decision will turn on the court's conception of sound public policy. 41
Today there are strong reasons militating in favor of finding
the due-on-sale clause a reasonable restraint on alienation without embarking upon a case-by-case inquiry into the motivation
of the lender or the possible impairment of his security, subject
always to the court's inherent obligation to probe for instances
of unconscionable conduct. Policy considerations must go beyond protecting lenders from the transfer of the mortgaged
premises to one deemed lacking in financial substance. Protection of one party to the transaction seems a biased approach.
Surely sound public policy must take account of the need for the
continued existence of financial institutions willing and able to
finance the purchase of homes.
The Modern Purpose of the Clause
Wellenkamp states that the sole purpose of the due-on-sale
42
clause is to protect against impairment of the lender's security.
The purpose of the clause, of course, is derived from the intentions of the parties agreeing to it. It is perhaps speculative to
ascribe any intention to the borrower,since he probably first became aware of the clause when confronted with the lender's requirement of higher interest upon a sale subject to the
mortgage. With regard to the lender's intention, there is little
doubt that in its early history the clause was used simply to prevent the sale to a poor credit risk. However, the intention of
lenders in the 1930's is not necessarily the same as in the modern era of rising interest rates and universally recognized inflation. At least in part, the due-on-sale clause in recent times
owes its existence to the fact that thrift institutions are keenly
interested in improving their yield by upgrading their loan portfolios. 43 These institutions know that the average home is sold
41.

It should be noted at the outset that the rule has not had a logical

and consistent development ....

This seems to be due to the fact that

such restraints vary greatly in form, and the application of the rule has
turned largely on such considerations as the kind of property involved,
the quality of the interest, and the form of the restraint. It has been

stated that 'probably nowhere in the law does one find more resort to
dogma than here.' Carey and Schuyler, Illinois Law of Future Interests,
p. 542.
While other reasons are sometimes given for the rule, it seems to
(citations omitcall for no other than that of sound public policy ....
ted).
Gale v. York Center Com. Coop., 21 Ill. 2d 86, 91, 171 N.E.2d 30, 32-33 (1960).
42. 21 Cal. 3d at 952, 582 P.2d at 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
43. See Flaherty, Illinois Land Trusts and The Due-on-Sale Clause, 65
ILL. B.J. 376, 377 (1977).
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every five to seven years, depending on the area of the country.
With escalator clauses fettered by usury laws,4 and alternative
mortgage instruments largely untested, 45 it is clear that the dueon-sale clause is, in a period of apparently uncontrollable inflation, a useful weapon in compelling replacement of old mortgages with new ones bearing market interest rates. It is myopic
for a court to overlook the inflationary forces made evident by
the very price of the property sold.
The judicial interpretation of the no-assignment provisions
of commercial and residential leases offers some analogy to the
due-on-sale clause. By the great weight of authority, a no-assignment clause requiring landlord consent gives the landlord
the right to refuse permission for any or for no reason. 46 At the
same time, the landlord is not allowed to exercise the clause
under certain conditions, such as the involuntary transfer of the
lease by bankruptcy or execution sale.4 7 An equivalent construction could be given the due-on-sale clause. In a typical
home sale, the clause should be enforced according to its express terms without examining the lender's reasons, yet enforcement can still be denied when special circumstances would
make acceleration unconscionable.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has taken a position
consistent with this interpretation. It has promulgated a regulation giving across-the-board, retrospective and prospective recognition to the clause with respect to its use by federal savings
and loan associations. 48 Thus, this highly responsible and wellinformed agency has signalled its belief that the clause is essential to the financial health of the thrift institutions. This apparent conflict with the Wellenkamp decision and California
statutes has given rise to a preemption controversy of major significance to the entire mortgage lending industry. Numerous
cases pending in federal court raise the issue whether the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses contained in loan instruments executed between federal savings and loan associations
and California residents should be governed by federal or state
law. One federal district court has ruled that state regulation of
the validity and enforceability of the due-on-sale clause in mortgage instruments of federal associations executed on or after
June 8, 1976 has been rendered inapplicable because FHLBB

44. See note 53 and accompanying text infra.
45. See note 54 and accompanying text infra.
46. 1 M. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES § 7.304a (1974).
47. KRATOVIL, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE § 345 (1972).

48. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11 (1978).
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regulations have preempted the field.49
THE DILEMMA OF THE THRIFT INSTITUTIONS

Prior to the credit crunch of 1966, thrift institutions were
successfully bearing the burden of financing sales of housing in
the United States. The interest rates offered depositers attracted sufficient funds to enable thrift institutions to provide
fixed interest, long-term mortgages. A fairly well developed brokerage system allowed mortgage money to move from capital
surplus to capital short areas without a corresponding move50
ment of mortgage instruments.
In 1966, interest rates rose and disintermediation began to
occur. Most significantly, the interest rates offered by federal
government securities resulted in massive withdrawals from the
thrift system. Funds available for mortgages shrank, as did the
spread between the interest rates offered depositors and the average interest rate of the thrift institutions' loan portfolios. The
situation has repeated itself twice since then, and the specter
looms today of another crunch caused by greater government
participation in the money market. The need to finance a
mushrooming federal debt is an unwelcome but obvious fact of
life.
In contrast with the plight of the thrift institutions is the situation of commercial banks, which deal mainly in short-term
loans tied to current interest rates and sweetened by compensating balances. Under present practices, the thrift institutions
make long-term loans at interest rates which quickly become obsolete. 5 1 In order to keep funds in the thrift institutions, and
hence in the home financing market, these institutions must be
able to offer their depositors a return greater than that available
from government securities. In addition, to keep these institutions solvent, they must be able to maintain a spread between
the rate they offer depositors and that of their loan portfolio. In
short, a method must be found to allow their long-term loans to
respond to increases in interest rates. In an inflationary economy no lender can borrow short-term and lend long-term and
survive.
49. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal.
1978).
See Comment, The Due-On Clause: A PreemptionControversy, 10 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 629-30 n.2 (1977), for some thirty cases then pending.
50. See note 2 supra.
51. Ashley, Use of "Due On" Clauses to Gain Collateral Benefits: A
Common Sense Defense, 10 TULSA L.J. 590, 592 (1975) [hereinafter cited as

Ashley].
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Current regulations permitting thrift institutions to offer
higher interest rates on six-month certificate at yields slightly
above the rate on twenty-six month Treasury bills, offer no solution. That rate jumped from 7 1/2% in June, 1978, to nearly 10%
at the end of the year. "Any bank that took that expensive new
money and invested it in a 30-year mortgage at 8 1/2% had to be
52
stupid or crazy."
Perhaps the least subtle approach to the problem has been
attempts to index the principal of the loan to the consumer price
index or another inflation barometer. However, the additional
"principal" has been held to be interest, and thus this arrange53
ment runs afoul of the usury laws.
Alternative Mortgage Instruments
A still open question is whether any of the alternative mortgage instruments 54 currently being developed can withstand legal challenges and obtain marketplace acceptance. The
principal forms being considered are: (1) the graduated payment mortgage (GPM), a fixed interest rate mortgage with a
modified payment schedule, where the monthly payments start
low and increase over the years, presumably in step with the
increased income of the borrower; (2) the deferred interest
mortgage loan (DIM), where principal payments are made according to a fixed schedule, but interest payments are deferred;
(3) the reverse annuity mortgage (RAM), designed for the older
borrower, who receives monthly or annual disbursements of the
loan over his lifetime, with the home being sold after his death
to discharge the debt; (4) the roll-over mortgage (ROM), similar
to the present amortized mortgage except that at periodic intervals the interest rate is renegotiated; and (5) the variable rate
mortgage (VRM), again similar to the present mortgage except
that the interest rate varies within limits to reflect changes in
the market rate of interest.
After extensive examination by Congress, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
serious objections to these instruments have emerged. Of
threshhold importance is whether any of these arrangements
52. Vincent J. Quinn, president of Brooklyn Savings Bank, as quoted in
Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1979, at 28, col. 2.
53. Aztec Prop. v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 530 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn.
1975) noted in 7 MEMPHIS ST. L.J. 450 (1976) & 11 TULSA L.J. 450 (1976);

Olwine v. Torrens, No. 861 (Pa. Sup. Ct., Sept. 22, 1975) noted in 93 BANKING
L.J. 223 (1976).
54. See generally ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE INSTRUMENTS RESEARCH
STUDY (Federal Home Loan Bank Board) (D. Kaplan dir. 1977) [hereinafter

cited as AMIR

STUDY].
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will be acceptable to mortgagors. In one survey, for example,
when the VRM was explained fully to prospective home buyers,
eighty-two percent opposed it. This is not surprising when it is
realized that if two home purchasers in 1950 signed a conventional mortgage and a VRM respectively, the purchaser who
opted for the VRM would be paying two and one-half times as
55
much interest today.
In addition, there are unresolved legal difficulties with the
alternative mortgage instruments. 56 To touch upon the myriad
problems buried in the RAM, for example, a borrower may be
unaware that his mortgage income could destroy his eligibility
for medicaid.5 7 Alternative mortgage instruments bristle with
complex legal and financial problems. 58 It is small wonder that
the thrift institutions have been extremely reluctant to embrace
these instruments. No statute or regulation attempts to deal
59
with the host of problems these instruments present.
It is totally unrealistic to conclude that untried alternative
mortgage instruments provide a ready solution to the thrift institutions' dilemma. This, today is a question, not an answer.
This makes the logic of enforcing the due-on-sale clause, as written, even more compelling. The mortgagor can still be given a
55. H.R. REP. No. 95-1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 11978] U.S.
CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS 9451; AMIR STUDY, supra note 54; NEW MORTGAGE
DESIGNS FOR STABLE HOUSING IN AN INFLATIONARY ENVIRONMENT (Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston) (F. MODIGLIANI & D. LESSARD eds. 1975).
56. Another factor that must be considered is the fact that the low or no
reduction of principal in the early years of a GPM mortgage increases
lender risk. This is accentuated by the fact that such loans may be ineligible for PMI insurance. The Model Private Mortgage Insurance Act, in force
in 20 states, requires the mortgage to have regular equal monthly payments.
AMIR STUDY, supra note 54, at Vol. III, xx-7.
57. See Ege, Legal Implicationsof the Alternative Mortgage Instrument,
in AMIR STUDY, supra note 54, at Vol. III, xx-30 (1977).
58. Barnett, Alternative Mortgage Instruments: How to Maintain
Lender Status, 96 BANKING L.J. 6 (1979).
59. The Wellenkamp court suggested the AMIs were preferable to "dueon-sale" clauses as a means of protecting the lender's portfolio yield. 21
Cal. 3d at 952 n.10, 582 P.2d at 976 n.10, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.10.
The FHLBB has authorized the use of AMIs in California as of Jan. 1,
1979. Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 1978, at 5, col. 1. At the same time, the Board
adopted permanent regulations for GPM, VRM and RAM AMIs. 43 Fed.
Reg. 59336 (1978) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-2). The regulations limit
associations to no more than a 50% investment in VRMs and the program
will be reevaluated in four years. See FHLBB Fact Sheet, December 13,
1978. See also Goldman, Disintermediation Under the Microscope, 75
F.H.L.B.B.J. 13 (1975); Cassidy & McElhone, The Flexible Payment
Mortgage, 74 F.H.L.B.B. J. 7 (1974).
On January 25, 1979, Senator William Proxmire introduced legislation
which would codify the FHLBB's action. Variable Rate Mortgage Act of
1979, S.218, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 647-48 (1979). The preamble
to this Bill reveals an intensely negative attitude toward the AMI.
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fixed interest, long-term loan. But when the home is sold before
the mortgage is paid off according to its terms, the thrift institution is always allowed to bring the interest into line with current
market rates. If the courts refuse to allow the thrift institutions
this opportunity over an extended period of rising interest rates,
one questions whether the present form of fixed interest mortgage can survive. 60 And at present it has no viable replacement.
Tunnel Vision Consumerism
Restraint of alienation decisions have always been founded
on the tenets of public policy, and the pronounced trend of policy today is in favor of consumerism. However, Wellenkamp
and the other pro-borrowers decisions, while ostensibly consumer oriented, tend to examine the consumer's interest rather
narrowly.
While no statistics are available, the decisions make it clear
that the institution seeking to enforce the due-on-sale clause is
almost invariably a savings and loan association. Of these, the
great majority of these associations are mutual as opposed to
stockholder associations. A mutual savings and loan association
is hardly a grasping financial monster sucking the life blood of
the downtrodden. It is an entity that makes home purchases
possible and distributes its earnings to its depositors, most of
whom are home owners.
On the other hand, the parties obtaining the benefits of nonenforcement of the clause under the Wellenkamp approach are
the mortgagor and the new buyer of the home. The buyer is in a
class of consumers least in need of a low interest rate. He is the
rare purchaser who is able to come up with the large down payment needed to buy a home subject to a mortgage. His savings,
no doubt, were invested up to the moment of home purchase in
high-yield investments. Moreover, in actual practice, if he bargains with the lender for consent to the sale he will often be able
to negotiate refinancing at below the current interest rate. The
argument that the purchaser needs protection from the possibility of having his sale opportunities limited is palpably fallacious.
There is nothing unconscionable about a buyer paying current
market rates. But all home purchasers need protection from
61
having the source of new mortgage funds dry up.

60. Bartke &Tagaropulos, Michigan's Looking Glass World of Due-onSale Clauses, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 971 (1978).

61. See generally Ashley, supra note 51.
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POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Redrafting the Clause
The controversy over the clause in its present form gives
rise to the question of whether it can be modified to increase the
probability of its enforcement. An obvious improvement would
be to have the clause state that, to obtain a waiver of acceleration, the new buyer must be personally satisfactory to the
lender, and criteria for satisfying the lender would include the
buyer's willingness to pay the current interest rate. The mortgage document could also state that an express intention of the
clause is to allow the lender to refinance the loan at current
rates in the event of the mortgagor selling the home. This language would serve to explicitly identify the purposes of the
clause to include portfolio upgrading. It would also anticipate
an argument by the mortgagor that the lender unfairly failed to
disclose his motivation at the time the contract was entered into.
This drafting approach might assist a lender before a court considering the propriety of the clause as a novel question. However, it is not suggested that this language would lead to a
reversal of position in those jurisdictions that have rejected the
portfolio argument. 62 Nor would it be helpful as to mortgages
constituting a lender's present portfolio.
The Uniform Land TransactionsAct
It has been suggested here that the reasoning behind
Wellenkamp and other pro-borrower decisions is unsound. A
statute may be necessary to permit enforcement of the due-onsale clause according to its terms. The Uniform Land Transactions Act, approved by the Uniform Commissioners and approved by the American Bar Association in February, 1978,
advocates such enforcement. In commenting on the Act's adoption of a due-on-sale clause, one commentator states:
This provision 63 rejects a recent trend of some courts to hold that
the lender may not accelerate the debt under a due-on-sale clause
unless he can show a reasonable basis to believe that the sale
would impair the security. Apparently, the drafters believed that
because of a justifiable business interest of lenders to adjust interest rates upward periodically in accordance with economic conditions, acceleration under a due-on-sale clause is always
62. Cf. Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163,
173-74, 250 N.W.2d 804, 809 (1977) ("We need not decide here whether disclosure ... of the ... clause's function as protection for the mortgagee's port-

folio would make more cogent the argument that enforcement ...

is

reasonable"). See also Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. of Charlotte, 289 N.C. 620, 633-34, 224 S.E.2d 580, 589 (1976) (Lake, J., dissenting).
63. ULTA § 3-208(a).

316

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 12:299

reasonable.

64

Adoption of this Act would thus permit use of the clause by
thrift institutions to upgrade their portfolios and would give effect to the views of the great body of American real property
scholarship. The Uniform Act, in short, offers a genuine longterm solution to the problem.
Federal Relief
The very comprehensiveness of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board study of alternative mortgage instruments 65 is evidence of the strong interest of the federal government in providing new tools that will allow thrift institutions to continue
mortgage financing. Possibly, alternative mortgage instruments
can be made both fair and workable. Congressional movement,
however, is glacial in tempo. The FHLBB's recent action, in
light of Congressional inaction and possible disapproval, can
only stress how seriously the Board viewed the dilemma of the
66
thrift institutions.
CONCLUSION

Despite the fact that it originally had a more narrow purpose, the due-on-sale clause has assumed the additional role of
allowing thrift institutions to replace mortgage loans at obsolete
rates with loans at current market rates. In this era of rising
interest rates, with no viable alternatives near at hand, it is imperative that these institutions be allowed to do this if they are
to continue mortgage financing. The courts that have rejected
the portfolio argument seem to disregard current social and economic reality. 67 If this judicial trend continues, the conse64. Bruce, Mortgage Law Reform Under the Uniform Land Transactions
Act, 64 GEO. L.J. 1245, 1272 (1976).
65. AMIR STUDY, supra note 54.
66. See note 59 supra. In introducing his bill, Senator Proxmire recognized the controversy and doubts about VRMs and termed the Board's action as "unfortunate," but thought it "essential that the Congress act
swiftly to reassert its authority and control of public policy on this issue."
125 CONG. REC. 647 (1979) (emphasis added).
Finally, it has been recently reported that the Carter administration is
considering fundamental changes in banking regulations that could lead to
higher interest for savers and put thrift institutions in more direct competition with banks. Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 1979, at 2, col. 3.
67. See Due-on Clause Report, supra note 6, at 936:
The determination of public policy as so propounded by the California
Supreme Court [in Wellenkamp] is a province of the legislature, and
not of the courts. A trend emerging from courts in placing burdens
merely on the basis of who can best afford to pay the risk is alarming,
especially when this determination is made on speculative and theoretical reactions, and not on intellectual inquiry.
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quences could be devastating. It is time for members of the bar
to seek a statutory solution to the dilemma of the thrift institutions.
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